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Background: From late February 2020, English care homes rapidly adapted their practices in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to accommodating new guidelines and policies, 
staff had to adjust to rapid reconfiguration of services external to the home that they would 
normally depend upon for support. This study examined the complex interdependencies of support 
as staff responded to COVID-19. The aim was to inform more effective responses to the ongoing 
pandemic, and to improve understanding of how to work with care home staff and organisations 
after the pandemic has passed. 
Methods: Ten managers of registered care homes in the East Midlands of England were interviewed 
by videoconference or phone about their experiences of the crisis from a structured organisational 
perspective. Analysis used an adapted organisational framework analysis approach with a focus on 
social ties and interdependencies between organisations and individuals. 
Results: Three key groups of interdependencies were identified: care processes and practice; 
resources; and governance. Care home staff had to deliver care in innovative ways, making high 
stakes decisions in circumstances defined by: fluid ties to organisations outside the care home; 
multiple, sometimes conflicting, sources of expertise and information; and a sense of deprioritisation 
by authorities. Organisational responses to the pandemic by central government resulted in 
resource constraints and additional work, and sometimes impaired the ability of staff and managers 
to make decisions.  Local communities, including businesses, third-sector organisations and 
individuals, were key in helping care homes overcome challenges. Care homes, rather than 
competing, were found to work together to provide mutual support. Resilience in the system was a 
consequence of dedicated and resourceful staff using existing local networks, or forging new ones, 
to overcome barriers to care. 
Conclusions: This study identified how interdependency between care home organisations, the 
surrounding community, and key statutory and non-statutory organisations beyond their locality, 
shaped decision making and care delivery during the pandemic. Recognising these 
interdependencies, and the expertise shown by care home managers and staff as they navigate 
them, is key to providing effective healthcare in care homes as the pandemic progresses, and as the 
sector recovers afterwards.  
Keywords: Homes for the Aged, COVID-19, Organisational healthcare, Interdependencies, 
Knowledge sharing,   
 
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 





COVID-19 produced a significant crisis in English care homes(1). Care home residents are especially 
at risk of COVID-19 because of their age, co-morbidities, prevalent frailty, cognitive impairment, and 
functional dependency(2). Residents are also rendered more vulnerable by virtue of frequent close 
and personal contact with other residents, and carers who attend to their needs. COVID-19 spread 
rapidly through care homes and, despite the efforts of staff, many homes were devastated by large 
numbers of deaths and associated illness in their residents and staff.  In the year to 19 June 2020, 
there had been more than 30,500 excess deaths among care home residents(3), and by 26 June 
2020, there had 268 deaths involving COVID-19 among social care workers(4).  
When COVID-19 first arrived in the UK, Public Health England (PHE) announced that care homes 
were not at high risk of exposure(5).  A UK national lockdown was announced on the 23rd March 
2020(6). Although care homes were referenced in early guidance about hospital discharge on 19
th
 
March 2020, the first government guidelines specifically focussed on care homes were not produced 
until 2nd April 2020(7). Recommendations around infection control, testing, workforce mobility and 
hospital transfers in care homes underwent multiple changes during the period from February to 
July(1). At the same time, as part of infection control, organisations which routinely provide support 
to care homes, including general practitioners and community based multidisciplinary teams, were 
asked to minimise contacts with care homes to those deemed essential.  This meant rapid 
reconfiguration of the support services that care home staff routinely rely on for advice and 
guidance. 
Despite gaps in the public policy response, care homes were not equally affected by COVID-19 
during this first wave of the pandemic. For example, over half of COVID-19 deaths in Scottish care 
homes during the first wave of the pandemic came from outbreaks in only 13 homes, and similar 
epidemiology was seen in the other UK nations(8). Some of the differences in experience between 
homes will have been due to chance and external forces outside the control of care home staff, but 
outcomes will also have been shaped by how staff navigated this complex and rapidly changing 
environment to make critical decisions about care delivery.   
Our research explores the experiences of care home managers as they navigated the challenges 
raised by COVID-19. These experiences took place against a background of longer standing 
challenges affecting long-term care in the UK. Care homes are critical to health and social care 
provision because they provide care for people who are vulnerable, frail, often approaching the end-
of-life and no longer able to receive care in other settings(9). There are 15,000 care homes in 
England, providing approximately 430,000 beds. 50% of care homes are run by profit-making 
business, 47% are not for profit and 3% are state run(10). Most care home staff are middle-aged or 
older and come from a black and ethnic minority background(11).  Care home work is often 
regarded as being of low status and many working in the sector only receive minimum wage. Despite 
several independent commissions and recommendations for reform(12,13), it is widely recognised 
that the long-term care sector in the UK is beset by systemic challenges. These include a lack of 
funding, fragmentation of supply leading to large variations in the quality and quantity of care, poor 
integration with the wider health and social care system, and problems in staff recruitment, 
retention and training(13,14). This is now recognised in the Ageing Well components of the NHS 
England Long-term plan(15). This includes specific objectives around Enhanced Health in Care 
Homes, but these are yet to be implemented(16). The increasing dependency of the care home 
population has led to role-extension for care home staff, who now attend to aspects of care that 
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would previously have been regarded as the responsibility of the National Health Service (NHS)(17).  
This has not been accompanied by commensurate re-allocation of funding and this has led to 
inequity of resource provision, with expenditure on care homes in the UK well below the (OECD) 
average(13).  
Given the above, we aimed to examine care home managers’ responses to the pandemic with 
consideration given to their location in a complex health and social care system.  We set out to learn 
lessons that might inform more effective approaches to working the care homes as the pandemic 
progressed, and which might prove useful beyond the pandemic as the sector recovered.  This work 
is part of a larger ongoing project focussing on how care home managers connect and interact with 
healthcare services and providers, but we have chosen to present this interim analysis given the 
urgency of the current crisis. 
Method 
To provide a framework for understanding the challenges faced by care home managers, we 
adopted an organisational systems approach. This views organisations as involving complex and 
contingent relationships between dynamic elements, rather than being static rational-bureaucratic 
entities.  In this instance we focused particularly on ‘interdependencies’ within homes, and between 
homes and external organisations. Interdependencies are defined as “a relationship between two or 
more elements (e.g. roles, units, work processes) that are linked or mutually reliant on each 
other.”(18) Interdependencies within organisations are often seen to be important because they 
provide insights into where there may be tension, collaboration, or ambivalence within 
organisational systems. This approach was chosen following initial conversation with participants, 
which suggested that their experience of the pandemic, and their ability to respond to it, was closely 
'tied in' to the relationships and processes of the wider health and social care system. In other 
words, while care homes are often felt to be left out of mainstream health and social care policy in 
the UK, in the face of the pandemic, the web of mutually dependent relationships was brought to 
the fore. 
From this initial insight, and following an inductive-deductive approach, we considered a series of 
interdependencies, interfaces and points of criticality and uncertainty likely to have a bearing on 
care home managers’ work.  Starting from the work of Worren(18), we focussed on care processes 
and practices, resources and governance.  We developed these ideas by rapid thematic analysis of 
the data as each interview was conducted. Through this process, newly formed networks emerged 
as being of critical importance and so we focussed particular attention on these in later interviews 
and transcripts. 
Ten registered care home managers were recruited from within the East Midlands of England. All 
were from homes registered for care of older people. Each manager had been employed at the 
home for at least six months prior to the interview. Participants were identified through existing care 
home networks, established by the research team through previous work conducted in and with the 
sector.  We used these as a starting point for a snowballing approach to recruitment, asking 
members who had previously participated in research to help us identify care home managers who 
had not been engaged in research before. We supplemented this by asking professional care and 
research networks to publicise the study using social media and electronic mailing lists. We chose to 
focus on managers new to research because many care home managers that we had routinely 
interacted with in the past through our research had engaged with online support forums alongside 
senior clinicians and academics(19). We considered that such experiences were likely to be atypical 
and we wished to explore broader accounts of how care homes responded to the pandemic.  
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Consent was obtained by email. Interviews were semi-structured, remote and conducted using 
either telephone or videoconferencing software. They lasted on average 35 minutes. Each interview 
was taped and transcribed verbatim by a qualified transcriber.  
Results  
The results focus on the relationships and changing nature of the key organisational ties as described 
by the practitioners and leaders as they experienced the pandemic. They also evidence the nature of 
interdependencies and the ways in which care home staff commonly experienced issues within each 
of these interdependencies. 
We present three main interdependencies: care processes and practices; resources; and 
governance. These issues were often intertwined but we present them here individually for clarity of 
explanation and understanding. Within each of these three interdependencies we highlight the 
problems and sources of resilience.  
Interdependencies of care processes and practices  
The first form of interdependencies were in the care processes and practices of the care homes, 
strongly shaped by their position as the endpoint of many NHS ‘care pathways’. As the pandemic 
broke, managers were faced with the challenge of delivering a broader range of (new) care duties as 
the wider health and social care system changed around them.  This included taking on care 
previously delivered by trained clinicians within primary and community care. Since many GP 
practices ceased visiting during the pandemic these regular care duties, such as injections and 
wound care, fell to the care home staff. Adapting to the restrictions of lockdown required new 
approaches to care, managing everyday care demands alongside COVID-19 requirements. This 
included developing approaches that enabled staff to simultaneously care for those without COVID, 
those who were COVID positive, and those recovering post-COVID who needed rehabilitation. There 
were additional demands of new COVID-related cleaning and administrative activities, for example, 
deep cleaning after COVID-infection and completing mandatory online reporting templates for the 
NHS.  
Daily routines also changed for residents. In some homes, residents were encouraged to participate 
in meaningful activities as an integral part of their dementia care. Residents assisted with infection 
control by taking on roles as door handle cleaners and general helpers. Staff were aware of the 
impact of the changes in routine, especially among residents with dementia and without any family 
networks. For these residents, the care home staff could not replace embedded routines, 
established before the pandemic, because of the increased demands on their time. The sudden 
cessation of routines led to expressions of anger towards the staff: 
“It’s heart-breaking, to be honest you know, I don’t want to be in their shoes. … we are 
trying our best but it’s not the same you know. I mean one particular lady I’m thinking of, 
our owner used to take her every Monday to the cake shop and they used to go for a 
coffee and have a cake, always had blueberry muffin and bring something back for the 
staff. And she couldn’t understand why she couldn’t … I mean she could see the minibus 
parked there and she was like getting really angry. Why can’t I go out you know, why can’t 
I go for a drive?” CH8, July 2020 
The increased death rate associated with COVID-19 in some homes caused a number of issues. In 
addition to the severe emotional toll of coping with dying patients, managers were asked, in places, 
to verify death without what they regarded as adequate training to do so.  Funerals could not be 
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attended by staff, family or residents, which was seen as adding to the emotional pain of death. 
While managers spoke of the ways in which digital media enabled residents to “attend” services 
where possible, this was often difficult for those with dementia. The idea of memorial events or 
services after the pandemic was regarded as being of spiritual and psychological importance by 
several respondents. Notably, none of the participants mentioned the absence of family members 
during the dying process, perhaps an indication of how lockdown had become normalised by the 
time of the data collection. One manager spoke of her devastation at accepting a previously 
unknown resident as a new admission to the home, only for the virus to spread through the home 
with the loss of 7 residents and 1 member of staff to COVID-19: 
“I blame myself for every death. I didn’t turn them away. A 96 year old in the back of the 
ambulance at 11pm at night. They knew we had a bed. But we only had a bed in the green 
zone. I could only use the green zone. Two days later their test came back positive. Too 
late then”.  CH5 July 2020 
In light of these experiences, managers reported feeling isolated, as if they had been left to deal with 
the rapidly increasing mortality and multiple demands of the crisis alone. This feeling was 
exacerbated during the early phases of the pandemic by the fact that there was little specific care 
home practice guidance to draw upon except pre-COVID legal and practice guidance. A commonly 
cited dilemma was where a resident hospitalised for COVID-19, could best be cared for by rapid 
return to their care home, even whilst they remained infective. Such decisions required daily 
emotional, moral and logistical energy as the managers struggled to make sense of the, sometimes 
conflicting, needs of individual residents and the need to protect the other people resident in the 
care home. 
Managers reported that the skills and determination of care home staff was a source of resilience. 
Managers spoke of pride in their teams, who worked with tenacity and creativity, and recognised 
skills that had previously not been required. For example, some staff proved adept at building 
relations with the local community, managing to secure supplies from shopkeepers when formal 
supply chains were unreliable.  Managers identified, and became more confident, in their leadership 
abilities as they led these teams.   
“I always thought I was just thinking on my feet, nothing more. But you know, this has 
shown me that I am far more. I can bring together my flock. I can lead. I show them every 
time that I mean what I say and do. They all know infection control inside out. They are all 
so great at it. Even my mobile foraging residents do infection control because they are 
good at it. They have their own cleaning kits. Bring them all on board.” CH3 June 2020 
Two homes deployed staff who spoke fluent Italian and Cantonese to monitor international media 
stations early in the pandemic. This enabled them to gauge the seriousness of the situation daily and 
was cited as key to the decision, in these two homes, to lockdown by the 2nd March 2020, three 
weeks earlier than the national lockdown and in direct opposition to all English government 
guidance at that time. This included a refusal to accept any admissions, family visits and, at one 
home, staff moved into the home for periods of 6 weeks continuously in rotation. Both homes 
(independently) drew on international sources of infection guidance in advance of any UK 
guidelines: 
“we knew this wasn’t a flu thing early. We had a member of our core staff and she gave 
daily updates to our management from Italian News. Old people were suffering. The 
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Italians love their old folks despite what our media was saying. So we decided as our 
residents are our folks. We love our residents. So we locked down”. CH4 June 2020 
In addition to the ‘hidden’ skills of staff, some managers reported consciously adapting their 
leadership style towards a more hierarchical “military” style of command. Managers were required 
to make rapid decisions on practice as well as provide reassurance to their staff, many of whom 
were frightened and exhausted.  Several managers devised “COVID-19 command centres” which met 
daily to review emerging evidence and data, and devise new care practices. These responsive 
management structures enabled managers to redeploy care home resources in novel ways in 
response to the pandemic. 
“The one thing we have started is we’ve got a big minibus, so we’ve got a few people who 
drive it and they are ringing relatives up and we’re doing like a drive-by wave or we’ll stop 
and they can talk through the window with them and things like that. Just to get the 
residents out of the home but they’re only on a bus.”CH4 July 2020 
Some managers reported closer relationships with their residents, despite physical distancing, 
because of the frequency and intensity of time spent together. Some managers reported improved 
health outcomes among their residents, with fewer infections, improved weight control and 
mobility. Some homes commenced new routines to help residents’ cope with lockdown, including 
daily exercise programmes, healthy eating regimes and daily activities. Large scale gardening and 
decorating projects had been undertaken with the residents as co-producers. These innovative 
approaches went some way to compensate for the lack of visiting from families and external 
agencies that would usually help with entertainment and occupation. 
“they’ve done really well. We remind and explain most days why the masks. They help us 
out. For the most confused and mobile we have given a cleaning carrier, so they can take 
part and we know where they are. We can’t isolate them. Washing hands is by washing up 
a few cups. We normalise it all…” CH2 June 2020 
Interdependencies of resources 
The second form of interdependence was in the supply networks for key resources needed to cope 
with the pandemic. One of the main issues was provision of personal protective equipment (PPE). 
During the early phases of the pandemic, this was in short supply to the care home sector with an 
increase in general demand and priority given to the NHS due to national shortage. In addition to 
core PPE requirements of aprons, face masks and gloves, some care home residents presented with 
symptoms such as diarrhoea, which demanded additional supplies of incontinence pads and extra 
laundry. These extra resource demands rapidly utilised the standard stocks of PPE held by most 
homes as a requirement for any infectious outbreak.  
“Overnight we lost our supplier of over 30 years to the NHS. So suddenly no PPE, no 
aprons, no gloves, no pads for the diarrhoea. They don’t mention the diarrhoea. So we had 
to pay 4000% more. One bottle which used to cost us £2.50 is now £52. So do the maths. 
We are a charity. We had to use soap and beg…the NHS took all our supplies” CH9 July 
2020 
As care homes became more formally incorporated in NHS supply chains, care homes continued to 
struggle to obtain adequate supplies. Deliveries were unpredictable and either smaller than 
anticipated or contained equipment of uncertain quality. Care home managers who worked for 
organisations with longstanding relationships with suppliers were particularly angered about this as 
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they felt this was a forced dependency for equipment which they had already procured prior to, or 
early in, the pandemic.  
“the issue with that was when the Government announced they would provide PPE 
equipment free of charge to all care homes and surgeries and whatever, which was fine 
but what they were doing was they were intercepting stock that we would have normally 
purchased from our suppliers. So then our supplier was saying we can’t send it out because 
we’ve got to give it to the Government. And so our options for buying stuff then was quite 
limited” CH6 July 2020 
Managers also reported financial difficulties in the face of extra running costs for staffing required to 
cover sick leave, topping up wages to supplement the government furlough scheme for non-
essential staff, and paying staff during shielding or self-isolation due to quarantine. Most home 
owners in our sample provided staff with bonus payments and free meals in recognition of the 
extraordinary commitment shown during the pandemic, but this added to financial strain. None of 
the homes operated zero-hour contracts or cut sick pay to the bare statutory minimum.   
Staff resource, meanwhile, was stretched.  Staff worked hard to cover rota gaps.  In some instances 
managers refused to accept agency staff that worked across multiple sites, recognising that they 
might be vectors of spread for infection.  This meant that staff had to work in ways that would not 
be tolerated in care home before, or in larger organisations during, the pandemic. 
“ that poor lass in that nursing home, it was the registered nurse, she did three shifts back-
to-back and ended up staying overnight. CH8 July 2020 
Space and environment placed important constraints on homes’ ability to respond to the pandemic 
in the way that was being recommended in government documents and external guidance. The 
concept of setting up cohorted areas or “red zones”, was challenged both by the amount of 
appropriate space in buildings that were not designed primarily as healthcare facilities, and by the 
availability of staff, and patient care resources.  Additional beds, bathing equipment, hoists and 
other lifting equipment were required depending on the residents being moved to these areas.  
Making safe decisions about infection control in the context of environmental constraints forced by 
buildings was seen as very demanding by managers. 
Home managers reported some sources of resilience to help combat these resource shortages. First, 
informal networking between care homes and domiciliary care agencies who were recipients of PPE, 
enabled diversion of resources to homes where the quality of PPE was inadequate in quantity or 
quality. Some homes used donated bedding, produced their own PPE from duvet coverings, or 
mobilised local businesses to manufacture items. Respondents also reported general practitioners, 
veterinarians, dentists, and heavy industry arranging to donate and deliver boxes of PPE urgently to 
the homes after news of shortages was reported in local and national media. Ski googles, sanitiser 
gels, bleach, toilet rolls, protective ventilation masks from heavy industry, home-made coveralls and 
extra bedding were also delivered to homes.  
“… a community school, …they made us all face shields. And they were all free, we got a 
hundred free. So we took what we needed and then gave the rest to all the supported 
living providers who actually were not really given any PPE because they weren’t entitled 
to it but they do … you know we’ve made sure that they’ve got them” CH4 July 2020 
In addition, informal networks of companies and voluntary organisations from the immediate 
locality also supplied other resources such as tablet computers, gardening and arts equipment. 
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Tablet computers were particularly useful because they enabled residents and staff to communicate 
with others such as family via video-calling software.  Numerous local organisations reached out 
towards the care homes with offers of practical help, knowledge sharing and financial support. We 
identified contributions by local businesses, schools and local third sector organisations of taxi rides, 
activity materials, bedding and food for staff, car maintenance, garden shelters to facilitate family 
visits, carpentry to zone buildings and singing/exercise/dancing outdoors for residents to enjoy 
watching. The care homes continued to value the deliveries of dementia friendly sleeves and 
“twiddle muffs” from knitting groups and gestures such as potted plants. These seemingly small 
items helped to make the teams feel part of their community.  
In addition to physical goods, managers reported an increase in volunteering of time and expertise 
from the local community. Local hospices volunteered their expertise in managing death and 
bereavement among staff and residents, with some hospice staff visiting the homes to offer direct 
end-of-life care to residents and to support staff. Online counselling and courses, personal phone 
calls and videoconference follow-ups were offered with specific support for the manager. As well as 
this, managers especially valued the ongoing support of families and local schools who regularly 
provided letters and artwork for the homes especially where staff were living in as part of the 
lockdown.  
“We’ve actually had the school, the local school sent us pictures from the children, 
chocolates for the residents, they’ve been absolutely lovely” CH4 July 2020 
Networks with other regional health providers were also crucial in dealing with clinical resource and 
knowledge issues. Pharmacists and hospices agreed to collectively store and maintain additional 
supplies of end-of-life medications and syringe drivers for use by several homes to facilitate rapid 
delivery as required and avoid delays in care. Care homes put these arrangements in place well 
ahead of changes to the law in May 2020 which enabled care homes to hold stocks of end-of-life 
medication(20). These “work arounds” for national protocols proved to be pragmatic and 
responsive, and ensured end-of-life medications were always available to the care homes. Larger 
groups of care homes, who had more resources to stay updated with changing government 
guidelines and evidence also reported sharing their knowledge with independent homes. New 
networks were being created despite previous barriers of geography and the intrinsic competition 
between providers which had previously limited links between homes.  
Interdependencies of governance 
The final form of interdependence that affected the impact of the pandemic on care homes related 
to governance. While there is considerable variation across the UK in the governance of homes 
depending on, for example, their size and ownership structure, what was noticeable was that there 
was considerable change in governance over the course of the pandemic.  In particular, home 
managers reported governance systems and structures becoming fractured with a perception that 
there were points of inequities and a lack of fairness in the application of rules, guidance and 
available support across the health and social care sector. Within this, care homes were often 
subject to wider systems of governance, enforced by state agencies, without necessarily benefiting 
from them.   
Care home managers felt that they were held accountable by regulatory agencies for the safety of 
their residents, while also being expected to follow general guidelines inappropriate for their 
settings. This challenged their accountability. For example, in an instance in which a care home 
‘locked down’ earlier than national guidance to protect residents, complaints were made by families 
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to the Care Quality Commission (CQC), which regulates and licences English care homes, about 
abuse of civil liberties. Difficult interactions with the CQC ensued, which the manager felt questioned 
her judgement, even though such approaches were adopted nationally a few weeks later. 
Reporting requirements imposed by external agencies multiplied quickly. Managers described the 
need to duplicate information inputs to meet the requirement by multiple external organisations, 
with no tangible benefit to the care home. A further concern for care home managers was that rules 
being imposed, with regard to care homes, were interpreted and managed differently by staff within 
and outside care homes. This was particularly evident during transfers of care, which were points of 
high risk of infection, and for which a number of guidelines had been developed.  There was a sense 
that hospital staff and care homes staff either interpreted, or adhered to, these differently.  This led 
to conflict and stress.  
“And it’s the constant debates with discharge coordinators and ward sisters is you know, 
really poor because they’re not following what we’re getting told. Now whether it’s their 
guidelines or totally separate but it still states in the guidelines for NHS discharges that 
they’ve to swab them but they’re not doing it. Community hospitals are doing it, they’ve 
done it, but the acute hospitals aren’t.”  CH2 June 2020  
Resilience in the face of changing governance requirements, was largely felt to come from the 
strength of existing ‘bottom up’ social networks. As one example, the following describes the local 
relationship between a care home manager and GP who sought to close a planning gap in the 
pandemic response by working collaboratively with other homes to evidencing issues around short 
staffing, forcing regional planners to develop contingency plans.  
“…So we kind of spent the weekend going through escalating and it got highlighted within 
the CCG and the care home cell you know, that….people [couldn’t] fulfil their registration 
of their organisation if they’d not got staff to keep it open?... there was not really a 
thought for how we were going to … what continuity we’d got with the community…plans 
were put in place quickly afterwards.” CH8, July 2020 
Previously firmly established ties with adult social workers and specialist NHS primary care staff 
remained at least as strong during the pandemic.  Some homes also reported more supportive ties 
with individuals in regulatory organisations such as the CQC, that they had previously not trusted. 
Third sector contacts, including in hospices, also proved invaluable, and were seen to act as 
knowledge brokers and boundary spanners between smaller, isolated care homes, acute NHS Trusts 
and Local Authorities. 
“…they’ve been brilliant the hospice. And they’re still fighting … and they’re fighting for us 
as well to get the testing, for all the staff and the residents on a regular basis” CH3 July 
2020 
Groups of care home staff collectively shared information such as policy changes via closed forums 
using online social networking technology. While this was seen to assist in the spread of relevant 
governance information, it should be noted that, for some staff, these were overwhelming in the 
volume messages and updates. Wearing PPE meant that mobile phones could not be accessed for 
long periods of the shifts and it was stressful to trawl through accumulated messages in breaks or at 
the end of shifts.  Two participants admitted leaving these groups because of fatigue and “COVID-19 
guilt”, which came about when having to talk about cases in their homes through peer networks.   
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The main findings of this research are the interdependencies between care homes, and external 
organisations and individuals, relating to care processes and practices, resources and governance. 
Centrally organised governmental responses to the pandemic often had counterproductive effects in 
care homes, resulting in resource constraints and additional work, and impairing the ability of staff 
and managers to make decisions about care of their residents.  Much of the resilience in the system 
was a consequence of dedicated and resourceful staff using existing local networks, or forging new 
ones, to work around the challenges brought forward both by the pandemic and the central policy 
decisions intended to deal with it. 
Some of the findings in this paper describe a care home sector placed in considerable jeopardy both 
by the pandemic and organised responses to it. The latter were insufficiently cognisant of, and 
insufficiently expert in, how care is delivered in and by care homes.  A countervailing narrative 
comes from the way in which local communities rallied around care homes to help them through.  
There is evidence, at times, that care homes were inadequately considered and valued by those 
making and delivering policy.  There is also evidence of largely unconcerted support efforts by 
members of the community, who clearly valued care homes, their staff, and the work that they do.  
Important lessons emerge, both for the remainder of the pandemic, and how care home staff are 
supported and facilitated in their role to care for their residents in the longer term. 
Previous studies have shown how care home managers and staff play an essential role in brokering 
relationships between residents and relatives, and statutory health and social care providers.  This 
has been shown to be the case for urgent and planned healthcare(21,22), in end-of-life care(23) and 
when working to improve and develop services(24). This study adds to this by showing the essential 
leadership and brokering role that managers and staff played in maintaining continuity of care 
during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Many of the strategies adopted by managers, 
relying largely on their own experience and intuition in the absence of coherent national guidance, 
reflected those which were reported to be effective in controlling the pandemic in care homes 
during the initial COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan Province, China(25).  These included establishing 
clear leadership hierarchies, regularly reviewing policies in light of emerging evidence, developing 
organisation-specific infection control policies, working to establish reliable supply chains in the face 
of shortages, and working with residents to maximise activity and engagement.  It was care home 
managers, working with local communities, that ensured these were in place, not central 
government policy. 
Our findings show that healthcare and care homes are interdependent, and that these 
interdependencies are complex.  Our findings show that when central and local government 
increased the formal reporting requirements placed on care homes, ostensibly to better understand 
their needs, it resulted in duplication of effort for an already overstretched staff, and risked 
jeopardising resident care.  When PPE supplies were centralised, it robbed those care home 
managers who were usually very competent managers of their supply chain, of control over their 
pandemic response.  Multiple previous studies have reported the need to engage care home 
organisations, managers and staff in changes to the design and configuration of care in the 
sector(17,26,27).  The findings presented in this paper show the potentially serious ramifications of 
the failure to do so. A valuable finding was the way in which are homes are interdependent upon, 
and embedded within, their local communities.  When formal healthcare and social care were slow 
to provide the necessary support to care homes, third sector organisations, schools, shops, 
manufacturers and hospices stepped in.   
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Care homes have historically been held, within the English system, as being private providers in 
direct competition with each other.  Recently there has been evidence that care homes may be 
prepared to work in a more concerted way as a sector when they engage with research 
networks(28) and in regional improvement programmes(29).  The findings presented here build on 
those from other studies conducted during the pandemic(19) which showed have shown the 
preparedness of care home providers to work together not only to provide peer-support, but also 
advice and expertise, and even critical supplies. 
This study has some limitations. Only care home managers were interviewed and not 
representatives of the NHS, public health organisations or social care. It is only a small sample 
(n=10). The majority of the study was conducted by one ethnographer and so may only present one 
worldview. The study continues to recruit and so these findings are interim ones based on ten care 
homes, all located within the East Midlands of England. There may be regional variation that these 
results fail to capture.  
These findings have important implications for how statutory health and social care providers work 
with care homes during the second and subsequent waves of the pandemic and beyond.  They also 
provide useful insights as improvement work with care homes continues beyond the pandemic and 
as national government proposes reconfiguration of the care home sector. It is important to 
recognise the ability of care home staff to identify and solve emerging issues in care homes. Care 
homes are under-represented at all levels of decision making – this must be rectified. The 
importance of care homes to their local communities, and the preparedness of communities to 
support care homes, is an important new finding.  This means that stakeholders in decisions about 
care home provision are potentially wider than previously recognised.  This requires that 
consultation must be broader when changes are implemented, but it also provides potentially novel 
opportunities for how care home staff can be supported by communities.  Finally, the care home 
sector has the potential to act in a more concerted, and collaborative way, than has been historically 
recognised by NHS and social care providers.  This potential for these networks to provide peer 
support and logistical solutions is an important future area of enquiry. 
Ethical Approval 
This study was approved by the Faculty of Medicine & Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee, 
University of Nottingham-02-0420. 
Funding 
This study is funded by the National Institute of Health Research Applied Research Collaboration- 
East Midlands (ARC-EM) award 200171.  The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not 
necessarily those of the NIHR or the Department of Health and Social Care. 
References  
1.  Devi R, Hinsliff-Smith K, Goodman C, Gordon AL. The COVID-19 Pandemic in UK Care Homes - 
Revealing the Cracks in the System. J Nurs Home Res. 2020;6:58–60.  
2.  Gordon AL, Goodman C, Achterberg W, Barker RO, Burns E, Hanratty B, et al. Commentary: 
COVID in care homes-challenges and dilemmas in healthcare delivery. Age Ageing. 2020. 
49(5):701-705 
3.  Office of National Statistics. Deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector, England and Wales: 
deaths occurring up to 12 June 2020 and registered up to 20 June 2020 (provisional), 
available online at 
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 





e2020andregisteredupto20june2020provisional (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
4.  Office of National Statistics. Coronavirus (COVID-19) related deaths by occupation, England 
and Wales: deaths registered between 9 March and 25 May 2020, available online at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeat
h/bulletins/coronaviruscovid19relateddeathsbyoccupationenglandandwales/deathsregistere
dbetween9marchand25may2020 (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
5.  Public Health England. Guidance for social or community care & residential settings on Covid-
19 Published 25th February (withdrawn 13 March 2020) available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-for-social-or-community-care-and-
residential-settings-on-covid-19/guidance-for-social-or-community-care-and-residential-
settings-on-covid-19 (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
6.  Dunn P, Allen L, Humphries R, Alderwick H. Briefing: Adult social care and COVID-19. 
Assessing the policy response in England so far. The Health Foundation. London. 2020. 
Available online at: https://www.health.org.uk/publications/reports/adult-social-care-and-
covid-19-assessing-the-policy-response-in-england (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
7.  Public Health England. Admission and Care of Residents during COVID-19 Incident in a Care 
Home, available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-
19-admission-and-care-of-people-in-care-homes (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
8.  Burton JK, Bayne G, Evans C, Garbe F, Gorman D, Honhold N, et al. Evolution and effects of 
COVID-19 outbreaks in care homes: a population analysis in 189 care homes in one 
geographical region of the UK. Lancet Heal Longev. 2020. 1(1): 21-31 
9.  Gordon AL, Franklin M, Bradshaw L, Logan P, Elliott R, Gladman JRF. Health status of UK care 
home residents: a cohort study. Age Ageing. 2014. 43(1):97–103.  
10.  Laing and Buisson. Care of Older People - UK Market Report. 2016. London.  
11.  Platt L, Warwick R. Are some ethic groups more vulnerable to Covid-19 than others? 2020. 
Institute of Fiscal Studies. London, available online at: 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/inequality/chapter/are-some-ethnic-groups-more-vulnerable-to-
covid-19-than-others/ (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
12.  The Commission on Funding of Care and Support, Dilnot AW. Fairer care fundingP: the report 
of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support. Vol. 1 / Andrew Dilnot. Vol. 1 / Andrew 
Dilnot. London: The Stationery Office; 2011.  
13.  The Kings Fund. Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in England. Available 
online at: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/commission-future-health-and-social-care-
england (last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
14.  Hussein S. “We don’t do it for the money” … The scale and reasons of poverty-pay among 
frontline long-term care workers in England. Heal Soc Care Community. 2017; 25(6):1817–26.  
15.  NHS Long Term Plan, available online at: https://www.longtermplan.nhs.uk/  (last accessed 
5th November, 2020).  
16.  NHS England. New Care Models: The Framework for enhanced health in care homes, 
available online at https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ehch-
framework-v2.pdf (last accessed 5th November, 2020)  
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted November 13, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.11.10.20229013doi: medRxiv preprint 
14 
 
17.  Goodman C, Davies SL, Gordon AL, Dening T, Gage H, Meyer J, et al. Optimal NHS service 
delivery to care homes: a realist evaluation of the features and mechanisms that support 
effective working for the continuing care of older people in residential settings. Heal Serv 
Deliv Res. 2017;5(29):1–204. 
18.  Worren N. Organization Design: Simplifying Complex Systems. Routledge; 2018.  
19.  Spilsbury K, Devi R, Griffiths A, Akrill C, Astle A, Goodman C, et al. Seeking Answers for Care 
Homes during the COVID-19 pandemic (COVID SEARCH). Age Ageing. 2020. Available from: 
https://academic.oup.com/ageing/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ageing/afaa201/5905867 
(last accessed 5th November, 2020) 
20.  UK Department of Health and Social Care. Coronavirus (COVID-19): reuse of medicines in a 
care home or hospice, available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-reuse-of-medicines-in-
a-care-home-or-hospice  (last accessed 5th November, 2020).  
21.  Robbins I, Gordon A, Dyas J, Logan P, Gladman J. Explaining the barriers to and tensions in 
delivering effective healthcare in UK care homes: a qualitative study. BMJ Open. 2013; 3: 
e003178 
 
22.  Chadborn NH, Goodman C, Zubair M, Souza L, Gladman JRF, Gordon AL. The Role of 
Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment in Healthcare of Older People in UK Care Homes: realist 
review. BMJ Open, 2019;9:e026921 
 
23.  Goodman C, Froggatt K, Amador S, Mathie E, Mayrhofer A. End of life care interventions for 
people with dementia in care homes: Addressing uncertainty within a framework for service 
delivery and evaluation Knowledge, education and training. BMC Palliat Care. 2015; 14(1):42.  
24.  Devi R, Martin G, Banerjee J, Butler L, Pattison T, Cruickshank L, et al. Improving the quality of 
care in care homes using the quality improvement collaborative approach: Lessons learnt 
from six projects conducted in the uk and the netherlands. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 
2020; 17(20).  
25.  Wang L, Qi N, Zhou Y, Zhang H. Prevention and infection control of COVID-19 in nursing 
homes: experience from China. Age Ageing [Internet]. 2020 Jun 25 [cited 2020 Nov 
7];49(6):894–5.  
26.  Gordon AL, Goodman C, Davies SL, Dening T, Gage H, Meyer J, et al. Optimal healthcare 
delivery to care homes in the UK: a realist evaluation of what supports effective working to 
improve healthcare outcomes. Age Ageing. 2018. 47(4):595-603 
 
27.  Marshall M, de Silva D, Cruickshank L, Shand J, Wei L, Anderson J. What we know about 
designing an effective improvement intervention (but too often fail to put into practice). BMJ 
Qual Saf;26(7):578–82.   
28.  Goodman C, Davies S. ENRICH: a new innovation to facilitate dementia research in care 
homes. Br J Community Nurs;17(6):277–277.  
29.  Darby J, Horne J, Lewin J, Cheryl C, Coates E, McEwan K, et al. Benchmarking the prevalence 
of care problems in UK care homes using the LPZ-i – a feasibility study. East Midlands Res into 
Ageing Discuss Pap Ser. 2017;(13).  
  
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted November 13, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.11.10.20229013doi: medRxiv preprint 
